Read the influential case of S. Mitchell v. Toledo Hospital, which was settled in early 1991, but is often cited and referred to in race and age discrimination cases today. Mitchell, a 51 year old African American woman, filed for race and age discrimination, following her termination from Toledo Hospital for mishandling client consent forms. Both the District Court and the Sixth Circuit ruled in favor of Toledo Hospital, concluding that Mitchell had not only failed to establish a prima facie, but had also failed to provide substantial evidence. Read the specific case details and to discover why one Judge believed Mitchell had been discriminated against. Also discover the standards used to determine “similarly situated” comparables. With the Mitchell case, a standard of “similarly situated in all respects” was used to compare Mitchell to other employees who were not terminated for misconduct, but in a later Sixth Circuit case the standards were modified.

Mitchell vs. Toledo Hospital No. 91-3268

S. Mitchell, an employee of Toledo Hospital, charged the Hospital with race and age discrimination following her termination for mishandling missing client consent forms. Mitchell, a 51 year-old African American female, had been employed at Toledo Hospital for 29 years. At the time of her termination, Mitchell was an accounts examiner, responsible for processing welfare forms and claims.

On December 5^th 1988, Mitchell approached her supervisor’s supervisor, R. Wachsman, about missing client forms, last seen in a box on an office coffee table. Wachsman confirmed that he had moved the coffee table, but did not say whether he had seen the forms. Mitchell continued to search for the box of forms and eventually found them the next day, December 6^th, in the Hospital basement. Instead of telling Wachsman that she had found the forms, Mitchell placed them under her desk, and told only one of her co-workers that she had found them.

Later that morning, Mitchell told three other co-workers about finding the forms, and all agreed to play a practical joke on Wachsman, joking that they would not tell him about finding the forms until Christmas. When Wachsman asked Mitchell if she had found the forms, she said she had not. Wachsman continued to search for the forms and Mitchell continued to keep them hidden under her desk for another day until she moved them to her personal file cabinet. On December 9^th, Wachsman found the forms locked in Mitchell’s file cabinet and confronted her. She said she had hidden the forms from Wachsman so he could “stew in his own mess.”

Mitchell’s actions, though meant as a joke, represented a “misuse of hospital property,” and resulted in Mitchell’s termination, as decided by the Hospital’s employee handbook and review board. Almost a year after her termination, Mitchell filed a complaint against the Hospital, claiming her termination was due to race and age discrimination and that her termination for misuse of hospital property was a pretext for discrimination. The District Court, however, found that Mitchell failed to produce evidence that was sufficient to prove that claim.

In legal terms, Mitchell failed to establish the four elements of a prima facie case: 1) to belong to a racial minority, 2) to be qualified for the position, 3) to be rejected/discharged from the position though qualified, and 4) to be replaced by a non-minority person. Though Mitchell satisfied the first three elements, she failed to show how she was replaced by a non-minority person. A prima facie case may also be established if one proves a non-minority person received better treatment than oneself through a comparison of factors. This comparison, however, must be between “similarly situated” employees—both must report to the same supervisor, perform the same job, and have participated in the same type of misconduct.

In an effort to establish a credible comparison, Mitchell claimed that a lot of white employees had not been terminated for behavior she felt was worse than hers. For instance, Mitchell stated that one woman had poor attendance and that another had cursed at her team leader. To Mitchell these examples were comparable in seriousness to her mishandling of client forms. Mitchell, however, not only failed to explain how the examples were comparable, but also failed to prove that the examples were any more than hearsay. Therefore, no valid complaint for discrimination could be tried on Mitchell’s assertions. The District Court concluded that the Hospital had presented accurate information, and that in order for Mitchell to issue a trial, she needed to set forth specific evidence of discrimination.

Mitchell did not provide such evidence and her case was dismissed by the District Court on February 20^th, 1991. Following their ruling, Mitchell appealed to the Sixth Circuit before Circuit Judges Jones and Nelson and District Judge Rosen. After review and discussion, Judge Jones dissented from the majority rule.

Jones cited from Mitchell’s testimony that she and her co-workers had agreed to play a practical joke on Wachsman. Mitchell had told her co-workers where the forms were hidden and all of her co-workers participated in the joke by not telling Wachsman where the forms were when he was looking for them. Mitchell, however, was the only one punished. The element that distinguished Mitchell from her co-workers was that Wachsman specifically asked her if she had found the forms and she lied to him. However, as Jones claimed, Mitchell was not fired for lying she was fired for misusing hospital property.

Revisiting prima facie, Jones found that Mitchell had established a prima facie as he compared Mitchell to the co-worker who had cursed at her team leader and had not been fired. Jones claimed that the two were comparable because both women had been guilty of “verbal insubordination.” Jones furthered his argument, stating that both women held the same position—specialized secretary. He continued that even though the two reported to different supervisors, they were comparable because the Hospital review board decided employee discipline. This, Jones claimed, established a prima facie. Jones then turned to the reason Mitchell was dismissed, explaining that Mitchell was the only one who sought the missing forms and rescued them from the basement, eventually locking them in her filing cabinet. Therefore, Mitchell was terminated for locking the forms away, which does not constitute a “misuse of hospital property.”

In opposition to Jones, Gerald E. Rosen, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan, reiterated Mitchell’s inability to present credible evidence of the alleged discrimination. Rosen also stressed that Mitchell had presented no evidence of the reported cursing presented above. Without substantial evidence that the cursing actually had taken place, one could not properly compare Mitchell’s behavior to the behavior of her co-worker. Furthermore, no evidence had been provided to verify Jones’s claim that both women held comparable positions that involved similar duties and responsibilities—Mitchell was an accounts examiner, while her co-worker was a file clerk. Rosen concluded that Mitchell produced no evidence to establish that she and her co-worker were “subject to the same standards”—i.e. similarly situated in all respects[1]. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s verdict and ruled in favor of Toledo Hospital, as Mitchell could not provide substantial evidence to support her claims.

Case study written by Jennifer Lozier – HR Advocate contributor

[1] David Hudson Jr. points out in his article on the standards used to determine “similarly situated” comparables that in the Mitchell case a standard of “similarly situated in all respects” was used to compare Mitchell to other employees who were [1] David Hudson Jr. points out in his article on the standards used to determine “similarly situated” comparables that in the Mitchell case a standard of “similarly situated in all respects” was used to compare Mitchell to other employees who were not terminated for misconduct. Hudson’s article, Confusion over ‘Comparables,’ examines how a later Sixth Circuit case—Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co—modified the standard to “similarly situated in all relevant respects. In later cases, however, the Sixth Circuit defaulted back to “similarly situated in all respects.” The fact that the Sixth Circuit has two varying standards for comparable circumstances is confusing to all parties. Two items that may play a part in deciding which standard is used would be the panel of judges and the amount of evidence. For instance, in the Mitchell case there was no substantial evidence, but with the Ercegovich case there was evidence that his comparables—the younger employees—had been transferred to other jobs within the company. Therefore, an argument can be made that unsubstantial evidence vs. substantial evidence may contribute to Sixth Circuit’s use of a different standard.